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approach to an otherwise frictionless business cycle model where firms and households
have incomplete information. We show how assumptions about information interact
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1 Introduction
What are the sources of aggregate fluctuations? A popular view is that business cycles are
caused by shocks to the confidence of consumers and firms. The view has been formalized
in recent business cycle models based on incomplete information (e.g., Lorenzoni, 2009; An-
geletos and La’O, 2013; Benhabib, Wang and Wen, 2015). Yet, few of these models have
been investigated quantitatively. At least in part, this is because the private information
structures governing people’s beliefs are hard to observe in the data or—as argued by Sims
(2003) and Woodford (2003)—may have no observable counterpart.
In this paper, we quantify the potential of confidence-driven business cycles using a novel
approach that bypasses the challenge of postulating ad-hoc information structures. The
approach takes the economic environment (technology, preferences, markets structure) as
given, but does not require a detailed specification of the information structure that governs
agents’ beliefs. Instead, we provide an “information-robust” characterization of all equilibria
that are possible within a given economic environment.
To do this, we map DSGE models with incomplete information into a “primal” economy
in which deviations from full information are summarized by wedges in agents’ equilibrium
expectations. We then develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an
information structure that is consistent with the expectation errors captured by these wedges.
Subject to these conditions, the primal economy is isomorphic to the incomplete-information
economy. Exploiting this equivalence, we derive a complete characterization of all equilibria
within a given economic environment independently from the information structure. The
characterization is quite general and applicable to a large class of linear rational expectation
models.
For a concrete application, we use our approach to ask: Under what conditions can
changes in confidence generate sizable fluctuations in aggregate economic activity? We ex-
amine this question in the context of an otherwise frictionless business cycle model driven by
shocks to aggregate productivity, along with shocks to local productivities and demand. We
allow for a general form of imperfect information, in which households and firms have access
to an arbitrary set of signals governing their beliefs about their own idiosyncratic shocks,
the aggregate state of the economy, what other agents believe, and so on. This includes the
possibility to learn from endogenous signals (e.g., Amador and Weill, 2010) along with many
others.
Whether the model generates aggregate fluctuations beyond those induced by aggregate
productivity shocks depends on its ability to generate expectation errors that are correlated
in the cross-section. There are two potential sources of such correlation. First, agents can be
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jointly optimistic or pessimistic regarding the aggregate state of productivity, as in Lorenzoni
(2009) or Angeletos and La’O (2010). Second, agents can be jointly optimistic or pessimistic
about their own idiosyncratic conditions, as in Angeletos and La’O (2013) or Benhabib, Wang
and Wen (2015), possibly accentuated by strategic uncertainty and higher-order beliefs. Both
channels are disciplined by the properties of the fundamental shocks to productivity and
demand. Our approach allows us to provide a general characterization of these restrictions
that does not hinge on a specific structural assumption about people’s information.
As a first result, we establish a novel theoretical benchmark for the case in which idiosyn-
cratic shocks are unrestricted by data. In this case, it has been previously demonstrated
that one can generate arbitrary macroeconomic volatility through confidence-driven fluctua-
tions if the idiosyncratic shocks are sufficiently volatile (Angeletos and La’O, 2013; Benhabib,
Wang and Wen, 2015). We go further, showing that confidence-driven fluctuations can in
principle generate any dynamic process for output and inflation, potentially bypassing all
cross-equation restrictions that obtain under full information, provided that agents do not
perfectly observe demand for their local goods when making production choices. If, on the
other hand, we impose some minimal requirements on the information of agents, we obtain
non-trivial cross-equation restrictions. For example, when local demand is perfectly observed
by firms, inflation must be procyclical regardless of what else firms might observe.
For our quantitative analysis, we use existing micro-data estimates (Foster, Haltiwanger
and Syverson, 2008) to calibrate the processes for idiosyncratic productivity and demand.
We then compute global upper bounds on confidence-induced output fluctuations, their per-
sistence, and the contemporaneous correlation with inflation (Figure 1 in Section 5). For an
empirically plausible calibration, the volatility-frontier for confidence-induced output fluctu-
ations is hump-shaped in aggregate persistence and is decreasing in the contemporaneous cor-
relation with inflation. For an aggregate persistence and inflation-cyclicality consistent with
U.S. data, the maximal one-step-ahead volatility of confidence-induced fluctuations is .011
(≈ 90 percent of the empirical one-step-ahead volatility of the U.S. output gap). We demon-
strate that the ability to generate sizable macro-volatility through confidence-fluctuations
hinges on the volatility of idiosyncratic demand shocks, whereas shocks to productivity play
a somewhat dispensable role.
Finally, we explore the degree to which confidence-driven fluctuations are consistent with
U.S. business cycle data. To this end, we estimate a prototype wedge-economy similar to
the one in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), which captures the U.S. business cycle by
construction. Our theoretical results permit us to partition the estimated wedges into an
informational component, which can be microfounded through incomplete information, and
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a non-informational residual. We find that, in principle, confidence-fluctuations can account
for a large portion of the U.S. business cycle that remains unexplained after conditioning
on productivity shocks. The ability of the model to generate sizable aggregate confidence-
fluctuations hinges, however, crucially on the presumption that firms do not know their
idiosyncratic product demands while making their production plans: If local demand is per-
fectly observed, at most 3 percent of observed output fluctuations can be accounted for by
any type of confidence. By contrast, if local demand is not observed but aggregate produc-
tivity is, up to 51 percent of output fluctuations can be explained by correlated confidence
regarding local conditions.
The methodology developed in this paper is closely related to Bergemann and Morris
(2013, 2016) and Bergemann, Heumann and Morris (2014). These papers demonstrate the
equivalence between Bayes equilibria in games with incomplete information and Bayes cor-
related equilibria. The approach developed in this paper is similar in that it also demon-
strates the equivalence between a class of incomplete-information models with another class
of full-information models. It is more general, however, as it is not limited to static game
environments, but equally applies to dynamic market economies, which is crucial for an ap-
plication to business cycles. Closely related to our application to dynamic macroeconomic
models, Passadore and Xandri (2018) develop robust predictions in dynamic policy games
with an application to sovereign debt.
On the applied side, our analysis relates to a recent literature on confidence-driven busi-
ness cycles. While the literature is mostly theoretical, there are now a few studies with
a quantitative focus. In particular, Huo and Takayama (2015a) quantify a version of An-
geletos and La’O (2013), and Blanchard, L’Huillier and Lorenzoni (2013) estimate a version
of Lorenzoni (2009).1 Our approach is distinguished by our general formulation of incom-
plete information that does not require an ex-ante stand on which agents are affected by
information-frictions, how information is shared in the cross-section of agents, or any other
parametric properties of the information structure.
The objective of this paper is also closely related to Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2017).
Departing from the assumption of rational expectations, those authors develop a tractable
framework in which agents’ expectations regarding the beliefs of other agents are subject
to reduced-form “confidence shocks”. They show that confidence shocks can account for a
significant portion of the U.S. business cycle, but abstract from the question whether those
1See also Melosi (2014, 2016) for an estimation of a variant of Woodford (2003), and Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt (2015) for plausible calibration of a particular DSGE model with rational inattention. In these
works, incomplete information alternates the propagation of fundamental shocks (productivity, monetary),
but there are no confidence-driven fluctuations.
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shocks can by microfounded by some information structure. Our approach is complimentary
in that we characterize the restrictions on confidence-driven fluctuations imposed by rational
expectations.
Our approach is also useful for reducing the computational burden of solving (and estimat-
ing) business cycle models with incomplete information. While the incomplete-information
version of our economy is hard to solve, the corresponding primal economy permits a sim-
ple aggregate representation, in which aggregate wedges capture the average deviations from
incomplete-information in the cross-section of agents. Conditional on these wedges, which are
constrained by the theoretical restrictions characterized by our approach, the primal economy
can be solved using standard tools developed for full-information models. In this ability to
reduce the computational burden of solving (and estimating) incomplete information models,
our paper also relates to Rondina and Walker (2014), Acharya (2013), Huo and Takayama
(2015b) and Acharya, Benhabib and Huo (2017), who use frequency-domain techniques to
obtain analytical solutions in certain models, and Nimark (2009) who explores the asymp-
totic accuracy of a finite-state approximation approach to a class of dispersed information
models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model economy.
Section 3 develops the information-robust characterization, and Section 4 applies it to derive
predictions about aggregate fluctuations. Section 5 calibrates the model and provides the
quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes. A general statement and proof of our main
representation result is contained in Appendix A.
2 The Model Economy
2.1 Economic Environment
The model is a standard RBC economy without capital, augmented with imperfect informa-
tion. Households and firms are located on a continuum of islands, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. On
each island, a representative household interacts with a representative firm in a local labor
market. Firms use the labor provided by households to produce differentiated intermediate
goods, which are aggregated by a competitive final goods sector located on the mainland.
There are no subperiods; all markets at date t operate simultaneously.
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Households Preferences on island i are given by
E
{ ∞∑
τ=0
βτU(Ci,t+τ , Ni,t+τ ) | Ii,t
}
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Ni,t is hours worked, Ci,t is final good consumption,
and Ii,t is the set of information available in island i at time t. The utility flow U is given by
U(C,N) = logC − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζ ,
where ζ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The household’s budget
constraint is
PtCi,t +QtBi,t ≤ Wi,tNi,t +Bi,t−1 +Di,t,
where Pt is the price of the final good, Qt is the nominal price of a riskless one-period bond,
Bi,t are local bond holdings, Wi,t are local wage rates, and Di,t are profits of the local firm.
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Bonds are in zero net supply, so market clearing requires
∫ 1
0
Bi,t di = 0. No other financial
assets can be traded across islands, which implies that households are exposed to idiosyncratic
income risk.
Intermediate-goods producers Each good i is produced by a monopolistically compet-
itive firm with access to a linear production technology,
Yi,t = Ai,tNi,t. (1)
Firms choose Ni,t to maximize expected profits, E[Pi,tYi,t −Wi,tNi,t| Ii,t], subject to an in-
verse demand curve specified below. The wage rate Wi,t is determined competitively.
3 The
productivity Ai,t consists of an aggregate and an island-specific component,
logAi,t = logAt + ∆ai,t,
2Following Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2015), we assume that bond positions adjust to clear the budget
constraint independently of the information available to households.
3Formally, firm i is representative of a continuum of firms, j ∈ [0, 1], competing in the local labor market.
Each of these firms produces a separate variety (i, j) that is aggregated to Yi,t using the technology Yi,t =
(
∫ 1
0
Y
1−1/η
ij,t dj)
η/(η−1) where η matches the elasticity of substitution across “island-varieties” specified in the
final good technology below. Clearly, the setting collapses to the one in the main text where Yi,t is produced
by a representative firm i that is competitive in the local labor market and faces isoelastic demand from the
final good sector with elasticity −η.
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where the aggregate component follows a random walk process
logAt = logAt−1 + t.
The innovation t is i.i.d. across time with zero mean and constant variance. The island-
specific component ∆ai,t follows a time-invariant, stationary random process that is i.i.d. across
islands and is normalized so that
∫ 1
0
∆ai,t di = 0.
Final-good sector A competitive final-goods sector aggregates intermediate input goods
i ∈ [0, 1], using the technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Zi,tY
η−1
η
i,t di
) η
η−1
,
where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among input varieties, Yi,t denotes the input
of intermediate good i at time t, and Zi,t is an island-specific demand shifter following a
time-invariant, stationary process that is i.i.d. across islands and satisfies
∫ 1
0
log(Zi,t) di = 0.
Profit maximization yields the inverse input demands, given by
Pi,t =
(
Yi,t
Yt
)−1/η
Zi,tPt, (2)
where the aggregate price index Pt is defined by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Zηi,tP
1−η
i,t di
) 1
1−η
.
Monetary policy We close the model by specifying a simple interest rate rule, pinning
down the equilibrium rate of inflation, pit ≡ log(Pt/Pt−1). Specifically, we assume that the
central bank sets nominal bond prices such that
it = φpit, (3)
where φ > 1 and it = − log(Qt).4
4The rule also contains a constant intercept ensuring consistency with the natural rate at the zero-inflation
steady state. The term is omitted since it drops out after we log-linearize the model below.
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2.2 Information Structure
At the core of this paper is an information-robust characterization of equilibria. Throughout,
we maintain the assumption of rational expectations, so that conditional on an information
set, all expectations are formed using Bayes law. The main novelty is that we do not take a
parametric stand on information. Instead we allow for all information structures subject to
the following three restrictions.
Assumption 1 (Information bounds). Θi,t ⊆ Ii,t ⊆ I∗t .
Assumption 1 defines a lower and an upper bound on information available in island i at
date t. The upper bound, I∗t , defines the history of all variables that are realized at date t,
so that agents cannot learn more than what is potentially knowable under full information.5
The lower bound, Θi,t, includes at least the actions of the agents living in island i. Apart from
this basic requirement of rationality, Θi,t can be specified arbitrarily, allowing the researcher
to explore a variety of informational assumptions. As a baseline, we adopt the following
specification for Θi,t:
Θbaselinei,t = {Ai,t, Ci,t, Ni,t, Yi,t,Wi,t, I∗t−h¯−1} ∪Θbaselinei,t−1 . (4)
Here we assume that (i) households and firms observe local productivities (and hence outputs)
in addition to their own actions and wages, and that (ii) all agents eventually learn the truth
at some horizon h¯+ 1 ≥ 0.6
We note that the minimal informational need not necessarily include the full set of publicly
available information at time t, because agents may not be aware of or use such information
in making their decisions, as is generically the case in the literature on rational inattention
(e.g., Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003). In Sections 4.2 and 5, we contrast the baseline with
alternative specifications for Θi,t.
Next, we make the usual assumption that all agents perfectly recall past information.
Assumption 2 (Recursiveness). Ii,t−1 ⊆ Ii,t.
Finally, we impose ex-ante symmetry across islands and time to streamline the exposition.
This does not restrict behavior of the aggregate economy.
5Notice that which variables are realized at date t is to some extent definitional. In particular, I∗t could
contain future innovations if they are realized at date t as in the news literature. In our application, we
abstract from this form of news, assuming all innovations to (Ai,t, Zi,t) realize at date t.
6For now, we do not impose that firms perfectly observe the inverse demand Pi,t at the time of making
their production choice Yi,t. As discussed below, this does not interfere with market clearing. The case where
Pi,t ∈ Θi,t is discussed in Section 4.2.2.
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Assumption 3 (Ex-ante symmetry). The unconditional distribution over (Ii,t, Ai,t, Zi,t) is
identical across all i and t.
Comment on prices and market clearing It is worth noting that our minimal as-
sumptions do not impose that agents perfectly observe prices, which would be unnecessary
restrictive.7 This does not mean, however, that agents are completely ignorant of prices,
which would prevent prices from clearing markets. To the contrary, imposing market clear-
ing in the parallel primal economy, which we describe in the next section, ensures that
agents’ equilibrium supply and demand decisions are as responsive to price changes as mar-
ket clearing requires. As a result, our approach allows us to avoid specifying the details of
the signals which agents use to learn about prices without compromising market clearing (see
Appendix E for details).
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
We work with a log-linear approximation to the model around the balanced growth path
of the economy with no heterogeneity and full information. Lower-case letters denote log-
deviations of a variable from the stochastic steady state where yi,t = at for all i and pit = 0.
The households’ Euler equation is given by
ci,t = E[ci,t+1 − φpit + pit+1 | Ii,t]. (5)
Combining firms’ demand for labor with households’ supply, local labor market clearing
requires
yi,t = ξ E[xi,t | Ii,t] + ai,t, (6)
where xi,t ≡ yi,t − ci,t + pi,t − pt is the nominal trade-balance on island i, and ξ ≡ 1/(ζ + 1).
The linearized price index pt is given by pt =
∫ 1
0
pi,t di. The linearized demand relation and
budget constraint take the form
pi,t = η
−1(yt − yi,t) + zi,t + pt (7)
7Limiting the ability of agents to learn from prices most importantly limits their ability to learn about the
aggregate state. Lorenzoni (2009) argues that, in practice, learning about aggregates is likely to be impaired
by a large number of shocks, model misspecification, and the presence of structural breaks. One specific
approach to capture these effects within a simple model like ours would be to decentralize markets so that
local prices no longer reflect aggregate states (e.g., Lorenzoni, 2009; Angeletos and La’O, 2013; Chahrour and
Ulbricht, 2017). An alternative interpretation is offered by the rational inattention literature (e.g., Mac´kowiak
and Wiederholt, 2015; Vives and Yang, 2017) where information sets do not reflect all the information that
is in principle attainable from prices due to finite processing constraints.
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and
βbi,t = bi,t−1 + xi,t, (8)
where bi,t ≡ Bi,t/(PtCi,t) is in levels rather than logs because Bi,t can take negative values.
Given a process for fundamentals and information {ai,t, zi,t, Ii,t}, an equilibrium of the model
is a set of processes {ci,t, yi,t, bi,t, pi,t} and {yt, pit} that are consistent with (5)–(8), with
Bayesian updating, and with market clearing for goods,
yt =
∫ 1
0
yi,t di =
∫ 1
0
ci,t di. (9)
(As usual, market clearing for bonds is implied by (8) and (9).)
3 Information-Robust Characterization
In this section, we present the methodological innovation in this paper. We begin by defining
a fictitious full-information version of our model in which all expectation errors are treated
as exogenous wedges. This parallel “wedge economy" can be solved using standard full-
information tools. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions on these wedges such
that they can be supported as expectation errors in an equilibrium of the incomplete in-
formation economy. The set of equilibria in the fictitious wedge-economy satisfying these
conditions corresponds to the set of all possible equilibria in the incomplete information
economy. Our equivalence result thus provides a tractable method of characterizing all
incomplete-information equilibria, without making parametric assumptions about the pri-
vate information structures of agents.
3.1 Primal Representation
Let Et[·] ≡ E[·|I∗t ] denote the full-information expectations operator. To arrive at the “pri-
mal” analogue of the economy characterized in Section 2.3, we replace all expectation oper-
ators E[·|Ii,t] with Et[·] + τi,t, where {τi,t} are treated as exogenous “expectation” wedges.
Specifically, in our case, we replace equations (5) and (6) with the corresponding primal
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equations:8
ci,t = Et[
(
ci,t+1 − τ ci,t+1
)− φpit + pit+1] + τ ci,t (10)
yi,t = ξ(xi,t + τ
x
i,t) + ai,t. (11)
Here τi,t = (τ
c
i,t, τ
x
i,t)
′ is two-dimensional as there are two expectation operators per infor-
mation set. The wedges τ ci,t and τ
x
i,t have the interpretation of prediction errors, relative to
full-information, regarding household i’s consumption target and island i’s terms-of-trade,
pi,t − pt, respectively.9 Note that both wedges are defined relative to the full-information
target that obtains taking as given the behavior of the rest of the economy (i.e., given the
expectation errors made on other islands).
3.2 Characterization Theorem
We now characterize implementability of the expectation wedges. Let F denote a stochastic
process for the fundamentals Ft ≡ {dai,t, zi,t}i∈[0,1], where dai,t ≡ ai,t − ai,t−1; let T denote
a stochastic process for the expectation wedges Tt ≡ {τ ci,t, τxi,t}i∈[0,1]; and let E(F , T ) denote
the set of equilibria in the primal economy induced by (F , T ). We assume the equilibria in
E(F , T ) have a stationary Gaussian distribution that is ex-ante symmetric across islands.10
The following theorem states the implementation result.
Theorem 1. Fix F , T and E ∈ E(F , T ). Then there exists an information structure consis-
tent with Assumptions 1–3 that implements T , and hence E, in the incomplete-information
economy if and only if (i) E[τi,t] = 0 and (ii)
E[τi,tθ] = 0 for all θ ∈ Θi,t (12)
hold for all i and t.
The theorem gives two conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient for T to be
implemented by some information structure. Condition (i) is simply the rationality require-
8Here τ ci,t is specified after rewriting (5) in its non-recursive form. With this normalization, τ
c
i,t defines
the gap relative to the optimal level of consumption that household i would choose if it had full information
at t and all future dates.
9Notice that as yi,t, ci,t ∈ Θi,t, all uncertainty about xi,t can be attributed to the terms-of-trade, pi,t− pt.
10These assumptions can be relaxed. First, in many cases, an appropriate transformation can be used to
induce stationarity in the primal economy. E.g., in our case, it suffices to define the primal economy in first-
differences to ensure stationarity of E as long as T is stationary. Second, while we assume E to be Gaussian,
the assumption is not needed when one is only interested in implementing the auto-covariance structure of
Et. Finally, ex-ante symmetry is imposed purely for notational convenience. See our general formulation in
Appendix A for an extension to non-symmetric cases.
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ment that an agent’s beliefs cannot be perpetually biased. Condition (ii) is an orthogonality
requirement between the expectation wedges and the corresponding lower bounds on infor-
mation Θi,t. The necessity of this restriction is the familiar result that expectation errors
must be orthogonal to all available information. The novel part of our result is the suffi-
ciency of this condition. For any E ∈ E(F , T ) with E[Tt] = 0, we can always construct an
information structure that implements the joint process E as long as it satisfies (12).
The following example illustrates this in a simple case. The general proof is given in
Appendix A and applies to arbitrary linear rational expectation models.
Simple example Consider an economy defined by a single equilibrium condition, yt =
E[at|It], where the fundamental at satisfies E[at] = 0, and let Θt = {yt−s}s≥0. The primal
economy is given by
yt = at + τt. (13)
Let Et = (yt, at, τt) be a stationary Gaussian process satisfying (13). Theorem 1 states that
for a given process Ft = at, Et is implementable by some {It}, satisfying yt ∈ It for all t, if
and only if (i) E[τt] = 0 and (ii) E[τtyt−s] = 0 for all s ≥ 0. The necessity of conditions (i)
and (ii) is immediate, since optimal inference requires that expectation errors are orthogonal
to variables in the information set and are unpredictable.
To see why the conditions are also sufficient, suppose that It = {ωt−s}s≥0 where ωt =
at + τt. That is, each period, the agent receives a new signal ωt that has the same joint
distribution over (ωt, Et) as the equilibrium “belief” yt that we wish to implement. Projecting
at onto y
t ≡ {yt−s}s≥0, we have
E[at|It] = Cov(at, yt)[Var(yt)]−1yt. (14)
Notice that
Cov(yt, y
t) =
[
1 0 0 · · ·
]
Var(yt). (15)
Further notice that (13) in combination with condition (ii) gives Cov(at, y
t) = Cov(yt −
τt, y
t) = Cov(yt, y
t). We can thus use (15) to substitute out Cov(at, y
t) in (14) to get
E[at|It] =
[
1 0 0 · · ·
]
Var(yt)[Var(yt)]−1yt = yt.
We conclude that as long as conditions (i) and (ii) hold, there exists a simple information-
structure {It} that implements Tt. Intuitively, observing the equilibrium expectation yt is a
sufficient statistic for forming E[at|It], giving us a simple means of implementing Tt.
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Generalization to arbitrary linear economies To streamline the exposition, we have
presented Theorem 1 in the context of a specific model economy. However, the proof of
the theorem is generic and applies to virtually any linear rational expectations model fea-
tured in the literature. Appendix A states the theorem for a general class of linear rational
expectations models. The generalized model allows for an arbitrary number of equilibrium
conditions involving an arbitrary mix of atomistic and aggregate agents with potentially
different decisions, shocks, state variables and information sets.
4 Inference about the Aggregate Economy
In this section, we explore how the theoretical restrictions of Theorem 1 translate into restric-
tions on the behavior of the aggregate economy. In a preliminary step, Section 4.1 derives
an aggregate representation of the primal economy, which can be fully described in terms of
“macro” wedges τ ct =
∫ 1
0
τ ci,t di and τ
x
t =
∫ 1
0
τxi,t di. Section 4.2 then maps the restrictions on
the “micro” wedges in Theorem 1 to restrictions on the macro wedges that derive from their
informational foundation.
4.1 Aggregation and Equilibrium in the Primal Economy
We begin with an explicit characterization of equilibrium in the aggregate primal economy.
Unlike the aggregate incomplete-information economy, which requires keeping track of the
cross-sectional distribution of beliefs, the primal economy permits a simple aggregate repre-
sentation. Integrating over (10) and (11), we have
yˆt = Et[yˆt+1 − τ ct+1 − φpit + pit+1] + τ ct (16)
yˆt = ξτ
x
t (17)
where yˆt ≡ yt − at is the level of output relative to its (full-information) potential.
Equations (16) and (17) define the aggregate dynamics in the primal economy. Common
prediction errors in the Euler equation, captured by τ ct , show up as an Euler equation wedge.
Similarly, the common prediction errors regarding the terms-of-trade, captured by τxt , corre-
spond to the usual definition of the labor wedge. Note that τ ct and τ
x
t are the sole drivers of
the aggregate output gap and inflation. If all agents had full information (τ ct = τ
x
t = 0), the
aggregate economy would be in its stochastic steady state where output reaches its potential
in every period (yt = at) and inflation is zero.
In general, a solution for endogenous variables as a function of the joint process τt ≡
12
(τ ct , τ
x
t )
′ can be obtained using standard numerical tools. In our case, a closed-form solution
is also available. Substituting out yˆt in (16), pit is characterized by the prediction formula
pit = φ
−1Et[ξdτxt+1 − dτ ct+1 + pit+1]. (18)
Following Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1981), we obtain an explicit solution for inflation, stated
in the following.
Lemma 1. Let τt = A(L)ut , where A(L) is a square-summable lag polynomial in non-
negative powers of L and the innovations ut are orthogonal white noise. Then there exists a
unique stationary equilibrium process for (yˆt, pit), given by
yˆt =
[
0 ξ
]
A(L)ut (19)
and
pit =
[
−1 ξ
] (1− L)A(L)− (1− φ−1)A(φ−1)
φL− 1 ut. (20)
4.2 Feasible Dynamics of Aggregate Wedges
To characterize feasible dynamics of the aggregate economy, we now explore how the restric-
tions in Theorem 1 constrain the fluctuations of the aggregate wedges τxt and τ
c
t . We begin
with the case in which Θi,t is given by our baseline specification (4). Alternative specifications
for Θi,t are considered in Sections 4.2.2–4.2.4.
4.2.1 Baseline Θi,t
To begin, observe that the information set in (4) is informationally equivalent to
Si,t = {dci,s, dyi,s, dai,s}ts=t−h¯ ∪ I∗t−h¯−1.
Here we have used that (i) ni,t and wi,t are linear combinations of (ci,t, yi,t, ai,t) and are there-
fore informationally redundant; and (ii) that for any finite horizon h¯, observing the sequence
of differences {dci,s, dyi,s, dai,s}ts=t−h¯ in addition to I∗t−h¯ contains the same information as the
corresponding sequence of levels.
To proceed, define ∆τi,t ≡ τi,t−τt as the idiosyncratic portions of the expectations wedges.
Similarly, define (∆ci,t,∆yi,t) as the idiosyncratic deviations from aggregate output. By con-
struction the “Delta”-component of any variable is orthogonal to any aggregate variable.
Hence, for any two variables xi,t and yi,t, we have Cov[xi,t, yi,t] = Cov[xt, yt]+Cov[∆xi,t,∆yi,t].
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The orthogonality conditions between the wedges (τ ci,t, τ
x
i,t) and minimal information observ-
ables (dci,t, dyi,t, dai,t) can then be written as:
Cov[τt, (dyt−s, dyt−s, t−s)] =
− Cov[∆τi,t, (∆dci,t−s,∆dyi,t−s,∆dai,t−s)] for all s ≥ 0. (21)
Condition (21) requires that any aggregate co-movement on the left-hand side is exactly
offset by corresponding “Delta” co-movements on the right-hand side. Our results from the
previous section imply that dyt can be written as a function of (τ
x
t , t). Accordingly, the
left-hand side is a function of aggregate wedges and productivity shocks only.
To make further progress, we now solve for ∆dci,t and ∆dyi,t on the right-hand side of
(21). Subtracting yt from both sides of (10) and (11), we obtain
∆ci,t = Et[∆ci,t+1 −∆τ ci,t+1] + ∆τ ci,t (22)
∆yi,t = ξ(xi,t + ∆τ
x
i,t) + ∆ai,t. (23)
Together with (7) and (8), conditions (22) and (23) define a (fictitious) small open economy,
which pins down the behavior of ∆dci,t and ∆dyi,t without need to reference aggregate vari-
ables in the economy. In Appendix C.2, we solve the “Delta-economy” in closed form, deriving
law of motions for ∆dci,t and ∆dyi,t as functions of Delta-fundamentals fi,t ≡ (∆ai,t, zi,t) and
Delta-wedges ∆τi,t. Using this solution to substitute out (∆dci,t,∆dyi,t) on the right-hand
side of (21), we obtain the following implementation condition for the macro wedges.
Lemma 2. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x
t ) and set Θi,t as in (4). Then
there exists an information structure consistent with Assumptions 1–3 that implements τ in
the incomplete-information economy, if and only if there exists a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process
∆τ such that
Γs(τ, ) = −Λs(∆τ, f) for all s ≥ 0, (24)
where
Γs(τ, ) ≡ Cov[τt, (dyt−s, dyt−s, t−s)]
Λs(∆τ, f) ≡ Cov[∆τi,t, (∆dci,t−s,∆dyi,t−s,∆dai,t−s)].
The mappings (τ, ) 7→ Γs and (∆τ, f) 7→ Λs are available in closed-form, stated in (51) and
(61) in the appendix.
Lemma 2 provides a general tool to verify implementability of any aggregate wedge pro-
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cess τt under various assumptions about the fundamentals {ai,t, zi,t}. Specifically, τ is imple-
mentable if and only if it has a finite MA(h¯) representation11 and the resulting covariance
matrix Γs(τ, ) is consistent with the Delta-moments Λs(∆τ, f).
Simple example (continued) To develop an intuition how Theorem 1 maps assumptions
on fundamentals to restrictions on expectation wedges, consider again the simple example
from above. Theorem 1 requires Cov[τt, yt−s] = 0 for all s ≥ 0 or, after substituting for
yt = at + τt,
Cov[τt, τt−s + at−s] = 0 for all s ≥ 0. (25)
Equation (25) is the simple economy’s counterpart to (21). Here the right-hand side is zero,
due to the absence of cross-island heterogeneity.
Equation (25) makes specific predictions about the covariance structure between τt and
at. In particular, evaluating (25) at s = 0 and noting that by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
Cov[at, τt] ≥ −
√
Var[at]Var[τt], it follows that the volatility of the expectation wedges is
bounded by the fundamental volatility:
Var[τt] ≤ Var[at].
Intuitively, the variance of expectation errors is bounded above by the variance of the forecast
target at. In the extreme where at is constant, there is no scope for confusion, so that τt = 0
in all possible equilibria.
Unrestricted micro-shock benchmark The simple example illuminates how the ana-
logue to Lemma 2 entails restrictions on the volatility and covariance of expectation wedges.
Compared to the example, a key difference in the model is the presence of cross-island het-
erogeneity (Var[fi,t] > 0), which can be used to support aggregate fluctuations, even if there
are no aggregate shocks. This is because the optimism and pessimism of agents regarding
local shocks can be correlated across islands even though the underlying fundamentals are
purely idiosyncratic (e.g., Angeletos and La’O, 2013; Benhabib, Wang and Wen, 2015).
As a benchmark, we now review what dynamics are possible if fi,t is treated as a degree of
freedom. The case where fi,t is instead fixed at a realistic calibration is studied in Section 5.
By construction, the chosen process for fi,t has no direct impact on the aggregate economy
and does not affect the aggregate equilibrium under full information.
11The restriction to finite MA processes arises, because I∗t−h−1 ⊆ Θi,t under our baseline specification for
Θi,t. Since all innovation to τi,t are part of Θi,t, the orthogonality requirement then trivially implies that τi,t
has to have a finite MA representation of order h¯.
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Proposition 1. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x
t ) and set Θi,t as in (4). Then
for any aggregate productivity process, a, there exists an idiosyncratic process, f , such that τ
can be implemented in the incomplete information economy.
The proposition implies that expectation wedges, supported by correlated optimism and
pessimism (across islands), can in principle generate any joint process in (yˆt, pit). This gener-
alizes Angeletos and La’O (2013) and Benhabib, Wang and Wen (2015), where expectation
errors about local shocks can generate arbitrarily large output variance if the local shocks are
sufficiently volatile. Proposition 1 shows that, beyond simply unconditional variances, “sen-
timent” fluctuations can implement arbitrary processes for τt and, by implication, arbitrary
autocorrelation structures among the aggregate variables, potentially bypassing all cross-
equation restrictions that emerge under full information.12 Intuitively, expectation errors
can easily be correlated, both because information can be correlated between households and
firms and because expectation errors by households generally affect both their consumption
and labor supply.
4.2.2 No Demand Uncertainty
Under the baseline specification for Θi,t, we make no assumptions regarding how firms and
households on island i learn about the inverse demand for the local good, captured by pi,t.
We now consider the case where pi,t is perfectly observed, so that the inhabitants of island i
face no uncertainty about the demand for the local export variety i when production plans
are made. That is, information is bounded below by
Θi,t = {pi,t−s}s≥0 ∪Θbaselinei,t . (26)
Because local outputs are known, the information contained in dpi,t is equivalent to
dpi,t + η
−1dyi,t = pit + θ−1dyt + zi,t. (27)
Following similar steps as before, we obtain one additional constraint, which in conjunction
with Lemma 2 characterizes the implementation frontier when pi,t ∈ Θi,t.
12In two related contributions, Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2017) and Ilut and Saijo (2018) illustrate
how incomplete information may introduce specific comovement patterns in various variables that differ
from full information. However, in contrast to the result in Proposition 1, these comovement patterns are
restricted by the specifics of the information-structures considered in these papers, translating into non-trivial
cross-equation restrictions.
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Lemma 3. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x
t ) and set Θi,t as in (26). Then
there exists an information structure consistent with Assumptions 1–3 that implements τ in
the incomplete-information economy, if and only if there exists a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process
∆τ such that
Cov[τt, pit−s + η−1dyt−s] = −Cov[∆τi,t, zi,t−s] for all s ≥ 0. (28)
holds in addition to (24).
Substituting (28) to (24) for s = 0, we obtain after some algebra the following restriction
on Var[yˆt] (see Appendix C.9 for a derivation):
√
Var[yˆt] ≤ ξ Corr[yˆt, pit]
1− Corr[yˆt, yˆt−1]
√
Var[pit]. (29)
Equation (29) restricts the volatility of yˆt relative to pit as a function of its autocorrelation
and the contemporaneous correlation with pit. The following proposition is an immediate
corollary.
Proposition 2. Set Θi,t as in (26). Then a process τ for (τ
c
t , τ
x
t ) with Var[τ
x
t ] > 0 is imple-
mentable in the incomplete information economy only if it implies inflation to be procyclical
(Corr[yˆt, pit] > 0).
To see the logic behind this proposition, recall that
τxt ≡
∫ 1
0
(E[pi,t − pt|Ii,t]− [pi,t − pt]) di = E¯t[pi,t − pt].
To generate an output gap, agents have to make correlated errors regarding the terms of
trade, either due to correlated optimism/pessimism regarding the (inverse) demand for the
local product, E¯t[pi,t] 6= pt, as in Benhabib, Wang and Wen (2015) or through a nominal
misconception, E¯t[pt] 6= pt, as in, e.g., Lucas (1972, 1973). Imposing pi,t ∈ Θi,t rules out the
first possibility, yielding
τxt = pt − E¯t[pt].
Because E[pt|Ii,t] cannot consistently over-predict pt under rational expectations, it follows
that yˆt = ξτ
x
t > 0 is more likely whenever prices are growing, implying that inflation must
be procyclical.
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4.2.3 Public Signals
Another commonly considered case is that agents learn from public signals about aggregate
variables. In general, for any common statistic st, Theorem 1 requires Cov[τi,t, st] = 0. As
Cov[τi,t, st] = Cov[τt, st], it immediately follows that for any st ∈ Θi,t, it must hold that
Cov[τt, st] = 0. Augmented by the additional orthogonality requirement, the characteriza-
tions in Lemmas 2 and 3 remain fully valid. The following lemma formalizes the result for the
baseline case; analog results hold for the alternatives considered above and in Appendix B.
Lemma 4. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x
t ) and set
Θi,t = {st−s}s≥0 ∪Θbaselinei,t .
Then there exists an information structure consistent with Assumptions 1–3 that implements
τ in the incomplete-information economy, if and only if
Cov[τt, st−s] = 0 for all s ≥ 0
and there exists a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process ∆τ such that (24) holds.
For instance, let st = at. Then the lemma implies that the aggregate response to pro-
ductivity shocks must be exactly that of the full information economy. Apart from this
restriction, any aggregate wedge process consistent with Lemma 2 continues to be imple-
mentable with at known.
For another illustration, consider the particularly stark case where st = (ut−h, t−h) with
ut being the innovations to τt as defined in Lemma 1. Here the aggregate state is perfectly
revealed to agents at some lag h ≤ h¯. In this case, Lemma 4 requires Cov[yˆt, yˆt−s] =
Cov[yˆt, pit−s] = Cov[yˆt, at−s] = 0 for all s ≥ h, restricting the autocorrelation of expectation-
driven fluctuations within an horizon of h periods. The result generalizes a similar result
in Acharya, Benhabib and Huo (2017), which bounds the persistence of a class of sentiment
shocks.13
13While the strong conclusions of Lemma 4 may suggest a limited scope of expectation-driven fluctuations
in macro variables, such conclusion would likely be premature as information that is in principle publicly
available may not be used much by private agents for the purpose of information extraction (e.g, Sims, 2003;
Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). As argued by Woodford (2003), when looking at the information that is
actually used by agents to form their beliefs, agents may never share common knowledge—even about signals
that have been in the public domain indefinitely.
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4.2.4 Heterogeneous Information Between Households and Firms
To streamline the exposition, we have so far imposed common knowledge among households
and firms within each island. While this assumption is common in the literature, it is arguably
unrealistic. In our quantitative exploration, we explore the differential role that household
and firm-side errors play for supporting aggregate fluctuations, letting households and firms
base their decisions on distinct information sets, Ihi,t and Ifi,t, bounded below by
Θhi,t = {Ci,t, Ni,t,Wi,t, I∗t−h¯} ∪Θhi,t (30)
Θfi,t = {Ai,t, Ni,t, Yi,t,Wi,t, I∗t−h¯} ∪Θfi,t. (31)
As the theoretical characterization is completely parallel to the one above, we defer the details
to Appendix B. Specifically, Lemmas 5 and 6 in the appendix provide characterizations in
analog to Lemmas 2 and 3, and Propositions 3 and 4 generalize the results in Propositions 1
and 2.
5 Quantitative Analysis
We now study the quantitative potential for confidence-driven business cycles under an empir-
ically plausible calibration of the fundamental micro-shocks. We conduct two main exercises.
First, we compute global upper bounds on confidence-induced output fluctuations, their per-
sistence, and the contemporaneous correlation with inflation. Second, we look at a specific
process for the macro wedges, estimated to fit U.S. business cycle data, and ask to what
degree those fluctuations are consistent with a theory of incomplete information.
5.1 Parametrization
We interpret one period as a quarter. The discount factor β is set to 0.99. The inverse Frisch
elasticity ζ is set to 0.5, the elasticity of substitution between input varieties η is set to 7.5.
The monetary policy parameter φ is set to 1.5. These values are within the range typically
used by the literature.
Next, we set the incomplete information horizon to h¯ = 14 quarters. While we do not
have strong priors regarding h¯, our choice is consistent with the horizon at which Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2014) find a significant response in professional forecasters’ expectation
errors to various fundamental and nonfundamental shocks. Later, we also explore the sensi-
tivity of our results to h¯, and demonstrate that once the horizon h¯ exceeds five periods its
19
impact on our results is modest.
It remains to choose processes for the island-specific productivities and demand. We
separate local productivities into a permanent component, µi,t, and a temporary component,
νi,t,
∆ai,t = µi,t + νi,t,
where νi,t is i.i.d. with zero mean and variance σ
2
ν . The separation ensures that agents
can be potentially confused about the precise state of ∆ai,t (and hence Et[ci,t+1]), even if
there are no aggregate productivity shocks. The persistent components {µi,t} as well as
the local demand shocks {zi,t} follow independent AR(1) processes with auto-correlations
(ρa, ρz) and one-step-ahead variances (σ
2
a, σ
2
z). The variance and persistence parameters
are set based on Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), who use plants’ price data to
disentangle demand from physical productivity shocks at the plant-level. Specifically, we
set ρa = ρz = .976, σa = .0552, σν = .0478, and σz = .2504, which imply within-product
dispersions and quarterly autocorrelations of zi,t and ∆ai,t that match the corresponding
statistics in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008).14
5.2 Feasibility frontier
Our first exercise explores the maximal output volatility—as a function of its persistence and
the cyclicality of inflation—that our model can generate via incomplete information about
{∆ai,t, zi,t}. To do so, we focus on the case where there are no aggregate productivity shocks
(Var[t] = 0), ruling out any fundamental source of aggregate fluctuations.
Volatility frontier (definition) Define σyˆ(τ) ≡
√
Var[yˆt|I∗t−1] as the one-step-ahead
volatility of output induced by τ , as implied by Lemma 1. Similarly, define ρyˆ(τ) ≡
Corr[yˆt, yˆt−1] as the first-order autocorrelation of yˆt, and define γyˆpi(τ) ≡ Corr[yˆt, pit] as the
contemporaneous correlation with inflation. We use Lemma 2 to numerically trace out the
volatility frontier for output as a function of its autocorrelation ρyˆ and its contemporaneous
correlation with inflation γyˆpi:
σmaxyˆ (ρ¯yˆ, γ¯yˆpi) ≡max
τ,∆τ
{σyˆ(τ)}
14The underlying calibration targets are .976 and .943 for the quarterly persistence rates of zi,t and ∆ai,t,
respectively, and 1.16 and .26 for the (unconditional) within-product dispersions.
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Figure 1: Feasibility frontier. The graph shows the maximal output volatility (denominated in percentage
deviations from the balanced growth path) that can be generated by incomplete information as a function of
aggregate persistence ρyˆ and the contemporaneous correlation with inflation γyˆpi.
subject to
Γs(τ, 0) = −Λs(∆τ, f) for all s ≥ 0
ρyˆ(τ) = ρ¯yˆ
γyˆpi(τ) = γ¯yˆpi
where Γs and Λs are defined in Lemma 2, f = (∆a, z) is the calibrated process for the
idiosyncratic fundamentals, and τ and ∆τ are independent (zero-mean) MA(h¯) processes.15
Results for baseline case Figure 1 presents the volatility frontier for Θbaselinei,t . Here σ
max
yˆ
is denominated in percentage deviations from the balanced growth path. The most striking
feature is the discrepancy at γyˆpi = 0. When inflation is procyclical (γyˆpi > 0), incomplete
information can explain an output volatility up to 1.76 percent. Evaluating σmaxyˆ at values
consistent with U.S. data, γyˆpi = .3 and ρyˆ = .9, the maximal volatility amounts to 1.1 percent,
which is about 9/10 of the corresponding volatility in the United States.16 By contrast, when
inflation is countercyclical (γyˆpi < 0), the maximal volatility is increased by about one order
of magnitude.
15W.l.o.g., the aggregate wedges τ can be parametrized using two innovations. The island-specific compo-
nent ∆τ loads on up to two innovations in addition to the fundamental shocks that drive f .
16The comparison is based on the estimation introduced in Section 5.3 and detailed in Appendix D.
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The reason for the discrepancy is a fundamental difference in the channels through which
the model generates procyclical and countercyclical inflation dynamics. As implied by Propo-
sition 2, countercyclical inflation dynamics are intrinsically tied to expectation errors regard-
ing local demand, which can be quite large for the calibrated process for zi,t. By contrast,
procyclical inflation dynamics typically require some nominal misconception17, which is dis-
ciplined by the volatility of aggregate prices that can be generated in the first place.
Micro shocks and macro volatility How do changes in the specification of {∆ai,t} and
{zi,t} affect the volatility frontier σmaxyˆ ? To explore the link from micro-shocks to macro-
volatility, we conduct comparative statics exercises in σa, σν , σz, ρa and ρz. Here we focus on
the empirically plausible case where the macro-correlations γyˆpi and ρyˆ are fixed at .3 and .9,
respectively. The implied volatility frontier, σmaxyˆ , is depicted by the blue dots in Panels 1–5
of Figure 2. As mentioned above, under the baseline calibration, we have σmaxyˆ ≈ 1.1 percent,
indicated by the “×”-marks in the figure.
The sensitivity is strongest in σz and ρz, indicating that correlated expectation errors
about the demand shocks {zi,t} are of critical importance for supporting fluctuations in
aggregate confidence. In particular, a reduction in σz from its baseline value of .2504 to .01,
reduces σmaxyˆ by a factor of three to .37 percent; an increase in σz to 1.00, increases σ
max
yˆ to
3.39 percent. Those comparative statics reflect the naturally increasing shape of σmaxyˆ in any
fundamental volatility. Intuitively, the more volatile zi,t (and ai,t), the larger the potential for
agents to make expectation errors, which is a direct consequence of the law of total variance
(Var[E{zi,t|Ii,t}] ≤ Var[zi,t]). In the extreme case where σz → 0, rationality requires that
E[zi,t|Ii,t] = 0 for all t, even if Ii,t contains no signal about zi,t.
Similarly to σz, variations in the persistence of zi,t also have a significant impact on σ
max
yˆ :
a reduction of ρz from its baseline value of .976 to .5, reduces σ
max
yˆ to .35 percent. An
increase in the persistence of zi,t to .99, increases σ
max
yˆ to 3.18. The role of ρz for supporting
expectation errors is two-fold. First, Var[zi,t] is increasing in ρz, increasing the potential for
expectation errors similar to σz. Second, persistence in zi,t (or in ∆ai,t), enables optimism
and pessimism regarding the wealth of the local household, independently from the direct
effects on contemporaneous labor supply and demand. As fluctuations in perceived wealth
translate into fluctuations in desired consumption, they can be used to induce pro-cyclical
17Perceived fluctuations in local demand cannot induce procyclical inflation dynamics because of consump-
tion smoothing. Under standard preferences, consumption typically goes up by less than output in response
to a temporary increase in local demand. (This is true as long as zi,t is not too persistent; in our calibration
it holds for ρz ≤ .997.) The Taylor principle (φ > 1) then implies that booms caused by correlated errors
regarding {zi,t} must be accompanied by a drop in inflation so that consumption and output are equilibrated
through the induced decline in the real interest rate.
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Figure 2: Feasibility frontier for alternate specifications of the micro-shocks {∆ai,t, zi,t} and for alternate
information-bounds {Θi,t}. The graphs show the maximal output volatility σmaxyˆ (denominated in percent-
age deviations from the balanced growth path) that can be generated by incomplete information for the
empirically plausible case where ρyˆ = .9 and γyˆpi = .3. The “×”-marks indicate the case where both the
micro-shocks and Θi,t are fixed at their baseline values shown in Figure 1.
inflation dynamics as in Lorenzoni (2009), which is instrumental for generating the targeted
cyclicality of inflation (γyˆpi = .3).
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By contrast, variations in the parameters of {ai,t} result in only moderate variations in
σmaxyˆ . In particular, reducing σa or σν to .01, implies only marginally smaller values of σ
max
yˆ ,
suggesting that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks {∆ai,t} play a somewhat dispensable
18In order to generate pro-cyclical inflation dynamics through optimism and pessimism about zi,t, the
information structure must mute the direct substitution effect on labor demand. This can be achieved, for
instance, by making agents (sufficiently) informed about pi,t (coupled with some nominal misconception as
in Lucas (1972, 1973), so that pi,t does not fully reveal zi,t), which is a sufficient statistic about E[zi,t|Ii,t]
for determining labor demand.
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role in our calibration.
Alternative information assumptions We now turn to the sensitivity of the volatility
frontier with respect to the lower bounds on information, {Θi,t}.
As a first alternative, we consider the case without demand uncertainties (pi,t ∈ Θi,t), as
characterized in Lemma 3. Under the baseline parametrization of {∆ai,t, zi,t}, this reduces
σmaxyˆ to 0.41, providing a first indication that uncertainty about firms’ demand might be
relevant to generate sizable confidence-fluctuations. Moreover, compared to Θbaselinei,t , the
sensitivity of σmaxyˆ in the parameters of {zi,t} is reduced, whereas the sensitivity in the
parameters of {ai,t} is heightened (illustrated by the gray squares in Figure 2). This is
because pi,t effectively serves as a signal regarding zi,t (see equation (27)), reducing the scope
for expectation errors about zi,t and, by implication, increasing the model’s reliance on ∆ai,t
for supporting aggregate fluctuations in confidence.
We next relax the assumption that households and firms share the same information set,
as characterized in Lemma 5 in the appendix (depicted by the red lines in Figure 2). Relative
to Θbaselinei,t , this increases σ
max
yˆ to 4.49 percent. This reflects the additional flexibility in Ifi,t
and Ihi,t, due to households not being required to perfectly know the local firm’s productivity
(i.e., ai,t, yi,t /∈ Θhi,t) and firms not being required to perfectly know households’ consumption
(ci,t /∈ Θfi,t). The stark increase in σmaxyˆ suggests that the common assumption of symmetric
information may in fact be quite restrictive.
Finally, we use the heterogeneous information setting to consider the case where only firms
have perfect information about pi,t, as characterized in Lemma 6 in the appendix (blue lines
in Figure 2). Compared to the symmetric-information case without demand uncertainty, σmaxyˆ
is slightly increased to 0.49. However, the difference between symmetric and heterogeneous
information is now much less pronounced, suggesting that imposing informational symmetry
is somewhat less restrictive when firms know their demand while making their production
choices.
Effects of incomplete-information horizon As a final comparative static, we evaluate
the sensitivity of σmaxyˆ in the incomplete information horizon h¯. Because the autocorrelation of
any MA(h¯ ≤ 4) process is bounded above by less than the targeted autocorrelation (ρyˆ = .9),
we have σmaxyˆ = 0 for all h¯ ≤ 4. Conditional on h¯ ≥ 5, the impact of h¯ is moderate,
especially for the cases without demand uncertainty. Under the baseline specification for
Θi,t, the impact is somewhat more pronounced, reducing σ
max
yˆ to .76 when h¯ is reduced to 10
quarters.
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5.3 Application to U.S. Business Cycles
We now explore the degree to which U.S. business cycle data is consistent with a theory
of incomplete information. To this end, we first estimate an unrestricted wedge process
τˆt ≡ (τˆ ct , τˆxt ) that in the tradition of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) best describes
the data. We then partition τˆt into an informational component τ
info
t (restricted by our
theoretical characterization) and an unrestricted residual component τ residt , and maximize the
contribution of the informational component τ infot under varying assumptions on {∆ai,t, zi,t}
and {Θi,t}.
5.3.1 Methodology
Here we briefly describe the initial estimation step and then formalize our approach to par-
titioning the estimated wedge process into an informational and residual component. A
detailed description of the preliminary estimation is contained in Appendix D.
Summary of estimation step We use the generalized method of moments (GMM) to
estimate the process τˆt that best matches the auto-covariance structure of quarterly U.S. data
on real per-capita output, inflation, nominal interest rates, and per-capita hours, targeting all
auto-covariances between zero and 8 quarters. All moments are computed at business cycle
frequencies, applying an high-pass filter with a cutoff of 32 quarters to the model and the
data. We model τˆ as MA(14) processes, which loads on two intrinsic innovations, denoted
by uˆt, in addition to the productivity shock ˆt.
Despite targeting more data series than there are shocks, the estimated process τˆt fits the
data quite well: the model replicates the U.S. auto-covariance structure within the confidence
bands of the data (see Figure 4 in the appendix). The productivity shock ˆt explains about
36 percent of the filtered variance in yˆt and about 11 percent to the filtered variance of yt.
19
The remaining fluctuations are explained by the intrinsic innovations uˆt.
Table 1 summarizes key moments of the estimated wedges (τˆ ct , τˆ
x
t ) and the estimated
productivity shock ˆt. Most noticeable is the strong positive correlation between the Euler
wedge and the labor wedge (Corr[τˆ ct , τˆ
x
t ] = .99) and both wedges’ negative correlation with
productivity growth (Corr[τˆt, ˆt] = −.27).
19The contribution of at to yˆt exceeds the one to yt, due to a negative correlation between at and yˆt,
reflecting a slow adjustment in response to productivity shocks.
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Table 1: Summary of estimated U.S. wedges
Contemporaneous correlation
Standard
deviation
First-order
autocorr.
with τˆ ct with τˆ
x
t with ˆt
τˆ ct 0.051 0.91 1.00 · ·
τˆxt 0.044 0.91 0.99 1.00 ·
ˆt 0.010 – -0.27 -0.27 1.00
Partitioning of the estimated wedges We partition the estimated wedge process τˆt into
an informational component τ infot and a residual component τ
resid
t ,
τˆt = τ
info
t + τ
resid
t . (32)
In parallel to τˆt, we model both components as statistically independent MA(14) processes,
τ infot = Φ
info
 (L)
info
t + Φ
info
u (L)u
info
t
τ residt = Φ
resid
 (L)
resid
t + Φ
resid
u (L)u
resid
t ,
where Φinfo , Φ
info
u , Φ
resid
 and Φ
resid
u are square-summable lag polynomials in non-negative
powers of L. The innovations, infot , 
resid
t , u
info
t and u
resid
t , are mutually orthogonal white
noise. In particular, infot and 
resid
t are innovations to aggregate productivity, satisfying
ˆt = 
info
t + 
resid
t , (33)
with standard deviations σinfo and σ
resid
 . The corresponding lag-polynomial Φ
info
 captures
how incomplete information regarding at influences the propagation of productivity shocks.
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The innovations uinfot and u
resid
t , each two-dimensional, are intrinsic shocks to τ
info
t and τ
resid
t .
Accordingly, the lag-polynomial Φinfou defines intrinsic fluctuations in τ
info
t , driven by expec-
tation errors, whereas Φresidu defines intrinsic fluctuations in the residual wedges τ
resid
t .
The defining difference between τ infot and τ
resid
t is that we impose the conditions of The-
orem 1 on τ infot , whereas τ
resid
t remains unrestricted. We gauge the potential role of in-
20Conversely, Φresid captures the effects of other potential frictions in propagating productivity shocks.
Splitting aggregate productivity into two independent innovations ensures that the volatility generated by
incomplete information is independent of the residual wedges τ residt . If we instead let τ
info
t and τ
resid
t load
jointly on the combined productivity shock t, we find that one can increase the variance contribution of u
info
t
almost arbitrarily through incomplete information regarding at and its propagation through τ
resid
t . Below
we also consider the case where agents perfectly observe aggregate productivity, in which case both settings
give identical results.
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complete information for explaining the U.S. business cycle by maximizing the contribu-
tion of expectation errors uinfot to the filtered variance of yˆt. Let yˆ
tfp
t ≡ E[yˆt|(infot−s, residt−s )s≥0],
yˆinfot ≡ E[yˆt|(uinfot−s)s≥0], and yˆresidt ≡ E[yˆt|(uresidt−s )s≥0] denote the projection of the output gap on
aggregate productivity, expectation errors, and residual shocks, respectively. Independence
of the innovations implies Var[yˆt] = Var[yˆ
tfp
t ] + Var[yˆ
info
t ] + Var[yˆ
resid
t ]. Then the maximal
contribution of uinfot is given by:
max
τ info,τ resid,σinfo ,σ
resid

{
Var[yˆinfot ]/Var[yˆt]
}
(34)
subject to two constraints. First, there must exist a (zero-mean) MA(h¯) process for {∆τi,t} so
that the informational component τ infot is implementable as characterized in Theorem 1. Sec-
ond, we require that the auto-covariance structure for (yˆt, pit, t) induced by (τ
info
t , τ
resid
t , 
info
t , 
resid
t )
is identical to the one induced by (τˆt, ˆt). Thus, our partitioned wedges are constrained to
produce output, productivity and inflation dynamics that match those observed in the United
States.
Observe that Var[yˆtfpt ] and Var[yˆt] are fully pinned down by the estimated wedge process
τˆt. Hence, instead of maximizing the contribution of u
info
t to Var[yˆt], we can equivalently
maximize the contribution of uinfot to the portion of yˆt that is not driven by the productivity
shock, Var[yˆt|{at−s}s≥0] = Var[yˆt]− Var[yˆtfpt ].
5.3.2 Results
The results are presented in Figure 3. To assess which conditions are necessary for incomplete
information to generate sizable aggregate fluctuations, we consider five specifications for the
lower bounds {Θi,t}, represented by the five lines in the graph. Along the principal axis, we
also consider variations in the parametrization of the micro-shocks {∆ai,t, zi,t}, scaling their
standard deviations, (σa, σν , σz), by up to ±1 order of magnitude relative to the baseline
calibration.21 With the exception of the symmetric information benchmark, all specifications
allow households and firms to have access to potentially heterogeneous information as in
Section 4.2.4.
Benchmarks As benchmark, we first consider the cases characterized in Lemmas 2 and
5, where few restrictions are imposed on information beyond rational expectations. In both
cases, confidence shocks can fully account for all U.S. business cycle fluctuations unexplained
21The scaling is applied to all three micro-shocks proportionately to their respective baseline values; i.e.,
the scaled standard deviations are given by (σa, σν , σz)× scale.
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Figure 3: Maximal contribution to U.S. business cycle volatility. The graph shows the maximal variance
contribution of uinfot to the portion of the U.S. output gap not driven by productivity, Var[yˆt|{at−s}s≥0],
computed at business cycle frequencies. The lines correspond to different assumptions on the lower bound
of information {Θi,t}. The variation on the principal axis considers alternative values for (σa, σν , σz), which
are scaled by up to ±1 order of magnitude relative to the baseline calibration (scale = 1).
by the productivity shock (Var[yˆinfot ]/Var[yˆt|{at−s}s≥0] ≈ 1), provided that (σa, σν , σz) are at
least as volatile as in our baseline calibration (scale ≥ 1).22 For the asymmetric information
case (red line), the result is also robust to a downward-scaling of the micro-shocks by up to
a factor of three. For the symmetric information case (blue dotted line), a reduction in the
micro-volatilities by a factor of two (three), reduces the maximal contribution to 90 percent
(67 percent).
Sentiments versus noisy learning about aggregate shocks The benchmarks show
that, in combination with productivity shocks, rational fluctuations in confidence have the
potential to fully account for the U.S. business cycle. We now take a closer look at which type
of confidence fluctuations are necessary to achieve this. Specifically, we differentiate between
two types of confidence: (i) correlated confidence about idiosyncratic business conditions
(aka “sentiment shocks”), and (ii) correlated confidence about aggregate productivity as in
Angeletos and La’O (2010) or about future average productivity as in Lorenzoni (2009).
22Note that this also implies a perfect account of all inflation-dynamics that are unexplained by the pro-
ductivity shock, since the partitioning of the wedges is constrained to implement the empirical covariance
structure for (yˆt, pit, t).
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First, consider the case of sentiment shocks. We isolate their potential contribution by
imposing perfect knowledge about the history of aggregate productivity as in Section 4.2.3,
eliminating any scope for TFP-driven fluctuations in confidence. Comparing the resulting
contribution (dashed green line) with the benchmark reveals that for small scales of the micro
shocks, confidence about aggregate productivity is indeed key for explaining the data. On
the other hand, when there is sufficient idiosyncratic volatility (scale ≥ 3), sentiment shocks
alone can do as well as the benchmark. For the baseline calibration (scale = 1), sentiment
shocks can account for 57 percent of non-productivity fluctuations in U.S. output.
Next, consider the case without sentiment shocks. To eliminate them, we set Θfi,t and
Θhi,t as in (30) and (31), augmented by {µi,t−s, zi,t−s}s≥0. Here we do not include the iid-
productivities, νi,t, in Θ
f
i,t or Θ
h
i,t as this would allow firms to fully back out at from observing
ai,t. However, because νi,t is serially uncorrelated and firms know ai,t, expectation errors
about νi,t have no direct effect on their actions, so that all fluctuations in confidence indeed
reflect imperfect information about the aggregate productivity state. The quantitative results
are shown by the gray squared lines in Figure 3. Under the baseline calibration of the micro-
shocks (scale = 1)23, TFP-driven fluctuations in confidence can explain at most 3.4 percent
of the empirical output volatility, indicating that sentiment-driven fluctuations in confidence
are indispensable for explaining the U.S. business cycle with information frictions. This is
because aggregate productivity shocks have only a limited importance by themselves, which
in turn limits the potential for optimism regarding them to drive the business cycle.24
Interestingly, however, the two cases without sentiment- and productivity-driven confi-
dence add up to less than the benchmark, indicating a complementarity between sentiments
and confidence about aggregate productivity. Such complementarity may arise, because
confidence-fluctuations of one type may serve as noise in endogenous signals regarding the
other type of fundamental shock.25 Confidence about aggregate productivity shocks may
therefore induce additional confidence about local conditions, and visa versa.
No demand uncertainty The final specification considers the case where firms know their
demand when making their production choices as characterized in Lemma 6 (solid blue line).
In this case, the maximal contribution to the empirical business cycle volatility amounts to 4.1
23Here we re-calibrate the local productivity shocks to attribute all productivity dispersion to νi,t. This
ensures that the inclusion of µi,t in Θ
f
i,t and Θ
h
i,t does not mechanically reduce the idiosyncratic noise that
prevents firms from learning at from observing ai,t − µi,t = at + νi,t.
24See Chahrour and Jurado (2017) and Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2018) for independent evidence
that productivity shocks play a small role in the business cycle. Indeed, Cochrane (1994) argues that all
directly-measurable aggregate shocks play a small role in driving business cycle fluctuations.
25See also Chahrour and Gaballo (2016).
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Table 2: Implied variance contribution to U.S. output
Contribution to
Var[yt|{at−s}s≥0] Var[yt] Var[yˆt]
Heterogeneous info benchmark 1.00 0.89 0.64
Symmetric info benchmark 0.99 0.89 0.63
No TFP-driven confidence 0.57 0.51 0.36
No sentiment-driven confidence 0.03 0.03 0.02
No demand uncertainty 0.04 0.03 0.02
Notes.—The table shows the share of output that can be accounted by the intrinsic shocks to the infor-
mational component of the estimated wedges, uinfot . The contribution of the productivity shock to Var[yt]
and Var[yˆt] is 11 and 36 percent, respectively. All variance contributions are computed at business cycle
frequencies for the baseline calibration of {∆ai,t} and {zi,t} (i.e., scale = 1 in Figure 3).
percent, which is almost as low as when fully shutting down all sentiment-fluctuations. The
result indicates that demand uncertainties are key for supporting a significant contribution
of sentiment-shocks.
Implied variance contribution to U.S. output The results in Figure 3 show the
business-cycle contributions to output volatility that is unexplained by productivity,
Var[y˜t|{at−s}s≥0] (equivalently Var[yt|{at−s}s≥0]). Table 2 computes the implied contribu-
tion to the overall volatility in yt and yˆt. The discrepancy between the three columns reflects
the contribution of the productivity shock to yt and y˜t. Looking at the contribution to
yt, sentiment-driven fluctuations in confidence can account for 51 percent of the empirical
volatility. Importantly, however, for a theory of incomplete information to generate signifi-
cant fluctuations in confidence, firms must face some uncertainty about their idiosyncratic
product demands. If this is not the case, then confidence fluctuations can at most explain 3
percent of the empirical volatility in yt.
6 Taking Stock
We have developed a method to quantify the potential of DSGE models with imperfect
information without taking a fully structural stand on the private information of agents.
Along the way, we established a conditional equivalence, which holds under the conditions
of Theorem 1, between models with dispersed information and a prototype wedge-economy
similar to the one in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007). The informational foundation
for these wedges is distinguished from existing theories in its ability to generate arbitrary
correlation patterns between these wedges (Proposition 1). Correlated wedges, in turn, are
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critical for the empirical viability of confidence fluctuations because the data imply a strong
correlation between the aggregate labor wedge and the Euler wedge. Expectations are a
natural candidate for generating the observed correlation, both because information can
be correlated between households and firms and because expectation errors by households
generally affect both their consumption and labor supply. Our results indicate, however, that
two features are crucial to achieve a quantitively important role for such a foundation: (i)
micro-shocks must be sufficiently volatile and (ii) idiosyncratic demand must be uncertain at
the time of production choices. Our analysis also indicates that observed micro-level volatility
is large enough to support substantial aggregate volatility: rational confidence shocks could
well explain the data. This suggests to us that future researchers may wish to investigate the
empirical evidence regarding (ii), that is, to measure the degree to which firms misperceive
their own demand shocks when making their input choices.
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A Representation Theorem
In this appendix, we present our main representation theorem and show how it applies to
the specific model introduced in the main body of the paper.
A.1 General Incomplete Information Model
Consider a linear economy with J different types of agents. Agents within type j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}
are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], but they are ex-ante symmetric: they differ only because of ex-post
realizations of shocks. Meanwhile, agents of two different types j and j′ may be distin-
guished by differences in their physical environment, differences in their economic objectives,
differences in their information, or by their fundamental nature (e.g., households vs. firms).
Non-atomistic agents such as a monetary authority can be introduced as part of any type j
by including their actions in the aggregate vector, gat (defined below).
The equilibrium conditions of such a model can be written as
0 =
J∑
j=0
E
{[
Aj1 A
j
2
] [ gi,t+1
fi,t+1
]
+
[
Bj1 B
j
2
] [ gi,t
fi,t
] ∣∣∣∣∣ Iji,t
}
(35)
with gi,t ≡ [∆gi,t; gat ] and fi,t ≡ [∆fi,t; fat ]. Here, ∆gi,t is a n∆g-dimensional column vec-
tor defining purely atomistic variables that satisfy the adding-up constraint
∫ 1
0
∆gi,t di = 0,
whereas gat is a nga-dimensional column vector defining purely aggregate variables. Simi-
larly, ∆fi,t and f
a
t define column vectors of purely atomistic and purely aggregate exogenous
Gaussian processes, evolving according to
∆fi,t = f
i(L)i,t (36)
fat = f
a(L)t, (37)
where again
∫ 1
0
∆fi,t di = 0. Note that gi,t and fi,t contain variables relevant for any class
j ∈ J (e.g., both household and firm variables), and that (gat , fat ) may include but is not
restricted to contain the averages corresponding to the variables defined by (∆gi,t,∆fi,t).
Different types of agents can be subject to different types of shocks, since they can load on
different elements in fi,t.
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A.2 Primal Representation
The primal representation of the economy is
0 =
(
J∑
j=0
[
Aj1 A
j
2
])[ Etgi,t+1
Etfi,t+1
]
+
(
J∑
j=0
[
Bj1 B
j
2
])[ gi,t
fi,t
]
+
J∑
j=1
τ ji,t (38)
We denote by E(F , T ) the set of equilibria of the primal economy with fundamentals Ft ≡
{∆fi,t}i∈[0,1] ∪ fat and expectation wedges Tt ≡ {τ ji,t}, which have stationary Gaussian dis-
tributions that are ex-ante symmetric across i.26 The literature offers myriad strategies for
solving models of the form in (38).27
A.3 Main Theorem
Before stating the general theorem, we generalize Assumptions 1–3 from the main text to
the more general context here.
Assumption 4 (Information bounds). {µji,t} ⊆ Θji,t ⊆ Iji,t ⊆ I∗t where µji,t defines the
“equilibrium expectations” implicit in the primal economy,
µji,t ≡ E[Aj1gi,t+1 + Aj2fi,t+1 +Bj1gi,t +Bj2fi,t|I∗t ] + τi,t.
Note that µji,t correspond precisely to agents’ equilibrium expectations in the information
economy. Accordingly, including µji,t as part of the lower bound Θ
j
i,t merely reflects the
standard rationality requirement that agents know their own expectations. For instance, the
requirement holds in the concrete economy in the main text, since the actions ci,t, ni,t and
yi,t encompass the expectations of agents.
Assumption 5 (Recursiveness). Iji,t−1 ⊆ Iji,t and Θji,t ⊆ Θji,t.
The assumption states that all agents perfectly recall past information available to them,
which is a standard consistency requirement imposed on dynamic learning models in most
economic settings. Our main theorem states conditions so that even with perfect recall,
we can construct a consistent information structure to implement Tt. The assumption is,
26Since our assumptions ensure that agents with type-j face ex-ante symmetric environments, any possible
asymmetry must pertain to equilibrium outcomes. Such endogenous asymmetries could be accounted by for
in our general environment by allowing for equilibrium policies to differ across otherwise identical types j.
27There is no need for equilibrium in the primal economy to exist or be unique. If E(F , T ) has multiple
elements, our results hold with respect to each of them. Even if E(F , T ) is a singleton, the incomplete-
information economy may still feature multiplicity as T itself may be driven by sunspot-realizations as in,
e.g., Benhabib, Wang and Wen (2015).
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however, not crucial for our results. If one wishes to allow for imperfect recall, an analog
version of the proof holds in that case.
Assumption 6 (Ex-ante symmetry). The unconditional distribution over (Iji,t, fi,t) is iden-
tical across all i and t, but not necessarily across j.
Compared to the formulation in the main body, the more general formulation of Assump-
tion 6 emphasizes the potential for including ex-ante information differences within the model
formulation in (35). In particular, otherwise identical groups of agents who have different
information sets can be incorporated by introducing an additional agent type j′ with an
identical economic problem to group j, but different information set Iji,t 6= Ij
′
i,t.
Theorem 1 (general version). Fix F , T and E ∈ E(F , T ). Then there exists an information
structure satisfying Assumptions 4–6 that implements T , and hence E, in the incomplete-
information economy if and only (i) E[τ ji,t] = 0 and (ii)
E[τ ji,tθ] = 0 for all θ ∈ Θji,t. (39)
hold for all i, j, and t.
A.4 Proof of Main Theorem
Consider any expectation wedge τ ji,t ∈ Tt from the primal economy and the corresponding
lower bound Θji,t on Iji,t in the incomplete information economy. Define the expectation
“targets”
aˆji,t ≡ Aj1gi,t+1 + Aj2fi,t+1 +Bj1gi,t +Bj2fi,t,
which emerge from the equilibrium E ∈ E(F , T ) of the primal economy.
We want to show that conditions (i) and (ii) are jointly necessary and sufficient for the
construction of some Iji,t ⊇ Θji,t such that
E[aˆji,t|Iji,t] = E[aˆji,t|I∗t ] + τ ji,t. (40)
When this is true, the actions of agents (i, j) holding information Iji,t in the information
economy will be the same as those of agent (i, j) in the primal economy, sustaining the
equilibrium; i.e. a solution to (38) will also be a solution to (35).
To conserve notation, we suppress (i, j) subscripts going forward.
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Necessity. Necessity is immediate, since optimal inference requires that expectation errors
are orthogonal to variables in the information set and are unpredictable. To see this, rearrange
(40) to get
τt = E[aˆt|It]− E[aˆt|I∗t ]. (41)
Computing the unconditional expectation over (41) yields E[τt] = 0. Similarly, postmultiply-
ing (41) by θt ∈ Θt gives E[τtθt] = E[aˆtθt|It] − E[aˆtθt|I∗t ] as θt ⊆ It ⊆ I∗t . Again computing
the unconditional expectation, we have E[τtθt] = 0 for all θt ∈ Θt.
Sufficiency. We demonstrate sufficiency by construction. Let at ≡ E[aˆt|I∗t ] and consider
the information set It = Θt ∪ {st−τ}τ≥0, where st ≡ at + τt = µt is a signal that replicates
the correlation structure of the expectation we wish to implement. Notice that It inherits
recursiveness from Θt, ensuring consistency with Assumption 5.
From the law of iterated expectations, we have E[aˆt|st] = E[at|st] as st ⊆ I∗t . Projecting
at onto st we obtain
E[aˆt|st] = Cov[at, st]Var[st]−1st
= Cov[st − τt, st]Var[st]−1st
= Var[st]Var[st]
−1st
= st, (42)
where the second line follows from the definition of st and the third line follows from condition
(ii) of the Theorem and the fact that st = µt ∈ Θt. Noting that by construction no other
θt ∈ Θt can improve the forecast about aˆt,28 we obtain
E[aˆt|st] = E[aˆt|It] = E[aˆt|I∗t ] + τt.
As the argument above applies to any τ ji,t ∈ T , we have constructed exactly the informa-
tion sets needed to satisfy (40) for all (i, j, t).
28To see this, note that the forecast error conditional on st is necessarily uncorrelated with any other
θt ∈ Θt: Cov[aˆt − E{aˆt|st}, θt] = Cov[aˆt − st, θt] = Cov[aˆt − at − τt, θ] = Cov[−τt, θt] = 0. Here the first
equality follows from (42); the second one follows per the definition of τt; the third one follows, because
aˆt − at defines the forecast error under full information I∗t , so that any θt ∈ Θt ⊂ I∗t must be orthogonal to
it; and the last equality follows from the conditions of the theorem.
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A.5 Baseline Economy
The equilibrium conditions of the model economy can be written in the general form above
with J = {0, 1}. Here we use j = 0 to refer to the full-information set (I0i,t = I∗t ) and j = 1
to refer to the information available to households and firms on island i. Specifically, let
∆gi,t = [∆ci,t,∆yi,t,∆pi,t,∆bi,t−1], gat = [yt, pit, pt−1] and ∆fi,t = [∆zi,t,∆ai,t] and f
a
t = [at].
Then the model economy is described by the following system of equations.
For j = 0 (full information), we have:
A01 =

· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · β · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · −1
 A
0
2 =

· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·

B01 =

1 · · · 1 · ·
· 1 · · 1 · ·
· η−1 1 · · · ·
1 −1 −1 −1 · · ·
· · · · · 1 1
 B
0
2 =

· · ·
· −1 −1
−1 · ·
· · ·
· · ·

For the equations describing the expectations of firms and households, we have:
A11 =

−1 · · · · · · −1 −1 ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
 A
1
2 =

· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·

B11 =

· · · · · · · · φ ·
ξ −ξ −ξ · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
 B
1
2 =

· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·

Here, the four equilibrium conditions (5)–(8) are captured by the first four rows in above
matrices. The last row defines pit. Together with the adding-up constraints on ∆gi,t and ∆fi,t
this completely describes the dynamic system.
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B Heterogeneous Information Between Households and
Firms
This appendix generalizes the theoretical characterization in Section 4.2 for the case where
households and firms base their decisions on distinct information sets, Ihi,t and Ifi,t.
This distinction between household and firm information sets manifests itself in the labor
supply and demand curves, which are given by:
wi,t = ζni,t + ci,t + E[pt|Ihi,t] (43)
wi,t = ai,t + E[pi,t|Ifi,t]. (44)
Combing equations, we obtain the same labor market clearing condition as before, stated in
(6), but where the “combined” labor wedge is now composed of household and firm errors
based on Ihi,t and Ifi,t, respectively:
τxi,t = τ
x,f
i,t − τx,hi,t
with
τx,hi,t = E[pt|Ihi,t]− pt (45)
τx,fi,t = E[pi,t|Ifi,t]− pi,t. (46)
Meanwhile, the Euler wedge, τ ci,t, is unambiguously associated with the household’s consump-
tion choice and only depends on Ihi,t.
As a benchmark, we impose lower bound on Ihi,t and Ifi,t stated in (30) and (31). The corre-
sponding implementation condition for the macro wedges, derived in analog to Section 4.2.1,
is given by:
Lemma 5. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x,f
t , τ
x,h
t ) and set Θ
h
i,t and Θ
f
i,t as in
(30) and (31). Then there exists an information structure consistent with Assumptions 1–3
that implements τ in the incomplete-information economy, if and only if there exists a (zero
mean) MA(h¯) process ∆τ such that
Cov[(τ ct , τ
x,h
t ), (dyt−s, dyˆt−s, dwt−s)] =
− Cov[(∆τ ci,t,∆τx,hi,t ), (∆dci,t−s,∆dni,t−s,∆dwi,t−s)] for all s ≥ 0 (47)
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and
Cov[τx,ft , (dyt−s, dyˆt−s, dwt−s)] =
− Cov[∆τx,fi,t , (∆dyi,t−s,∆dni,t−s,∆dwi,t−s)] for all s ≥ 0. (48)
The mappings (τ, ) 7→ (dy, dyˆ, dw) and (∆τ, f) 7→ (∆dc,∆dy,∆dn,∆dw) are available in
closed-form, stated in Appendix C.6.
As (30) and (31) are each a subset of Θbaselinei,t , the benchmark established in Proposition 1
continues to hold in the current heterogeneous information setting.
Proposition 3. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x
t ), and set Θ
h
i,t and Θ
f
i,t as in
(30) and (31). Then for any aggregate productivity process a there exists an idiosyncratic
process f such that τ can be implemented in the incomplete information economy.
Similar to before, we also consider the variation where
Θfi,t = {Ai,t, Pi,t, Ni,t, Yi,t,Wi,t, I∗t−h¯} ∪Θfi,t, (49)
so firms face no demand-uncertainty. From (46), it is clear that knowledge of pi,t suffices to
fully shut down the firm wedge (τx,fi,t = 0). Intuitively, firms only need to know their marginal
costs, wi,t − ai,t, and their local demand, pi,t, to behave as if they have full information (see
also Hellwig and Venkateswaran, 2014).
Lemma 6. Fix a (zero mean) MA(h¯) process τ for (τ ct , τ
x,f
t , τ
x,h
t ) and set Θ
h
i,t and Θ
f
i,t as in
(30) and (49). Then there exists an information structure consistent with Assumptions 1–3
that implements τ in the incomplete-information economy, if and only if there exists a (zero
mean) MA(h¯) process ∆τ such that
τx,ft = ∆τ
x,f
i,t = 0 for all i, t
holds in addition to (47).
The next proposition generalizes the conclusion in Proposition 2 to the case where only
firms learn about pi,t.
Proposition 4. Set Θhi,t and Θ
f
i,t as in (30) and (49). Then an aggregate process τ for
(τxt , τ
c
t ) with Var[τ
x
t ] > 0 is implementable in the incomplete information economy only if it
implies inflation to be procyclical (Corr[yˆt, pit] > 0).
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As before, with pi,t known by firms, all output deviations away from potential must be
driven by misperception of aggregate nominal conditions, ruling out countercyclical inflation
dynamics.
C Additional Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The characterization for yˆt is immediate. To solve for pit, let pit = pi(L)ut, define
A˜(L)ut ≡
[
−1 ξ
]
A(L)ut = ξτ
x
t − τ ct ,
and substitute in (18) to obtain
pi(L)ut = φ
−1
[
(L−1 − 1)A˜(L) + L−1pi(L)
]
+
ut
where [·]+ sends negative powers of L to zero. Applying the z-transform, we obtain the
following functional equation
(z−1 − φ)pi(z) = (1− z−1)A˜(z) + z−1A˜0 + z−1pi0. (50)
Stationarity requires pi to be analytic on the unit disk (Whiteman, 1983). Evaluating (50)
at z = φ−1 ∈ (−1, 1), therefore, pins down
pi0 = (1− φ−1)A˜(φ−1)− A˜0,
so that
pi(z) =
(1− z)A˜(z)− (1− φ−1)A˜(φ−1)
φz − 1 .
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From the discussion in the main text, it follows that the following three conditions are jointly
necessary and sufficient to invoke Theorem 1:
1. E[τt] = E[∆τi,t] = 0,
2. τt and ∆τi,t are independent MA processes of at most order h¯,
3. condition (24) holds.
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It remains to characterize the mappings Γs and Λs.
Characterization of Γs The mapping Γs is immediate from (19),
Γs(τ, ) = ξCov[τt, dτ
x
t−s]× [1, 1, 0] + Cov[τt, t−s]× [1, 1, 1]. (51)
Characterization of Λs We now solve the “Delta-economy” for the endogenous law of
motions for ∆dci,t and ∆dyi,t. The equilibrium of the Delta-economy is defined by (7), (8),
(22), (23) together with the definition for xi,t:
∆pi,t = −η−1∆yi,t + zi,t
βbi,t = bi,t−1 + xi,t
∆ci,t = Et[∆ci,t+1 −∆τ ci,t+1] + ∆τ ci,t
∆yi,t = ξ(xi,t + ∆τ
x
i,t) + ∆ai,t
xi,t = ∆yi,t −∆ci,t + ∆pi,t.
The system can be rewritten as
Et[d∆yi,t+1] = δEt[ξ−1d∆ai,t+1 + dzi,t+1 + d∆dτxi,t+1 − d∆τ ci,t+1] (52)
βbi,t = bi,t−1 + ξ−1(∆yi,t −∆ai,t)−∆τxi,t (53)
where δ ≡ (η−1 + ξ−1 − 1)−1, and consumption is determined by
∆ci,t = −δ−1∆yi,t + zi,t + ∆τxi,t + ξ−1∆ai,t. (54)
Fix some process (∆τ ci,t,∆τ
x
i,t,∆ai,t, zi,t)
′ = B(L)υi,t, where B(L) is a square-summable
matrix-polynomial in non-negative powers of the lag operator L and the vector υi,t are white
noise shocks. Conjecture
∆yi,t = ξ(β − 1)bi,t−1 + Φ(L)υi,t. (55)
Substituting (55) in (53), it must be that
Φ(L)υi,t = ξβdbi,t + ξ∆τ
x
i,t + ∆ai,t. (56)
Using (55) to eliminate ∆dyi,t+1 in (52), we have
(β − 1)ξdbi,t +
[
(L−1 − 1)Φ(L)]
+
υi,t =
[
−δ δ δξ−1 δ
] [
(L−1 − 1)B(L)]
+
υi,t (57)
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where [·]+ sends the negative powers of L to zero. Further using (57) to eliminate dbi,t in
(56) and applying the z-transform, we obtain the following functional equation
(1− β−1z)Φ(z) =[
−δ δ δξ−1 δ
]
[(1− z)B(z)−B0] + Φ0 + (1− β−1)
[
0 ξ 1 0
]
B(z)z. (58)
Evaluating (58) at z = β ∈ (−1, 1), pins down Φ0 and Φ(z), from which we obtain the
following equilibrium process for d∆yi,t ≡ dy(L)υi,t and d∆ci,t ≡ dc(L)υi,t:
dy(z) =
[
−δ δ δξ−1 δ
]
(1− z)B(z) +
[
δ ξ − δ 1− δξ−1 −δ
]
(1− β)B(β) (59)
and
dci,t =
[
1 0 0 0
]
(1− z)B(z) +
[
−1 1− δ−1ξ ξ−1 − δ−1 1
]
(1− β)B(β). (60)
Collecting equations, we obtain
Λs(∆τ, f) = Cov
∆τi,t,
 1 0 0 0−δ δ δξ−1 δ
0 0 1 0
 (1− L)B(L)υi,t−s

+ Cov
∆τi,t,
−1 1− δ
−1ξ ξ−1 − δ−1 1
δ ξ − δ 1− δξ−1 −δ
0 0 0 0
 (1− β)B(β)υi,t−s
 (61)
for
∆τi,t =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
B(L)υi,t.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition is proved by construction. In particular, we provide an algorithm that for
arbitrary {Γs}h¯s=0 constructs processes ∆τ and f to satisfy (24).
To begin, substitute (61) to (24), post-multiply both sides by
M ≡
1 1 00 δ−1 0
0 −ξ−1 1
 ,
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and apply the z-transform, to obtain the equivalent functional equation
Γ˜(z) =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
[
B(z)(1− z−1)B(z−1)′]
+
1 0 0 00 1 0 1
0 0 1 0

′
+
+ B(z)(1− β)B(β)′
−1 1− δ
−1ξ ξ−1 − δ−1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

′ (62)
where Γ˜(z) ≡ Z{−ΓsM}s≥0 is the (one-sided) z-transform of {−ΓsM}, and whereB parametrizes
the joint process (∆τi,t, fi,t) as in the proof of Lemma 2. In particular, let
B(L) =
Bτ (L)Ba(L)
Bz(L)

where Bτ (z) is a lag-polynomial of size 2 × n, Ba(z) and Bz(z) are each lag-polynomials of
size 1× n, and n is an arbitrary number of innovations. Then (62) can be further rewritten
as
Γ˜1(z) + Ω(z) =
{
(1− z−1)Bτ (z)Bτ (z−1)′
}
+
+ Ψ(z) +Bτ (z)Bτ (β)
′Λ (63)
and
Γ˜2(z) =
{
(1− z−1)Bτ (z)Ba(z−1)′
}
+
, (64)
where Γ˜1 and Γ˜2 correspond to the first two and third column of Γ˜, respectively, and where
Ψ(z) ≡
{
Bτ (z)
[
(1− β)Bz(β)′ (1− z−1)Bz(z−1)′
]}
+
and
Ω(z) ≡ −(1− β)(ξ−1 − δ−1)
[
Bτ (z)Ba(β)
′ 0
]
and
Λ ≡
[
−(1− β) 0
(1− β)(1− δ−1ξ) 0
]
.
Fix N ≤ h¯ as the largest non-zero power of z in Γ˜. Consider the following parametric
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structure for Bτ , Ba, and Bz:Bτ (z)Ba(z)
Bz(z)
 =
λτ (z) Iλa(z) (1− z)−1λa,0
0 λz,0 + λz,1z

with
λτ (z) =
[
λτ,1 + ρz · · · λτ,N + ρNzN
]
and
λa(z) =
[
(1− z)−1λa,1 · · · (1− z)−1λa,N
]
,
and where {λa,j, λz,j} are of size 1 × 2 and {λτ,j} are of size 2 × 2. Observe that Bτ is at
most of order h¯ in line with the requirements of Lemma 2.
Condition (64) then simplifies to
Γ˜2(z) = λτ (z)λ
′
a + λ
′
a,0.
So for any λτ , it suffices to set
λa,s = ρ
−sΓ˜′2,s ∀s ≥ 1, and
λa,0 = Γ˜
′
2,0 −
N∑
j=1
λ′τ,jλa,j
in order to satisfy orthogonality with respect to ai,t.
Regarding condition (63), we have that
Π(z) ≡ Γ˜1(z) + Ω(z)− Λ− I =
{
(1− z−1)ττ (z)ττ (z−1)′
}
+
+ Ψ0 + λτ (z)λτ (β)
′Λ
where
Ω(z) = −Γ˜2(z)
[
(ξ−1 − δ−1) 0
]
and
Ψ0 ≡ Ψ(z) =
[
(1− β) (λ′z,0 + βλ′z,1) λ′z,0] .
Notice that (i) the left-hand side, Π(z), is exogenously determined by the aggregate economy
that we are trying to implement, and (ii) we have Ψ0 as a degree of freedom to induce an
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arbitrary unconditional covariance on the right-hand side. Writing out the right-hand side
in the time-domain, we have
Π0 = Ψ0 − ρλ′τ,1 +
ρ2
1− ρ2 +
N∑
j=1
λτ,jλ
′
τ,j(I + Λ) +
N∑
j=1
ρjβjλτ,jΛ (65)
Πs = ρ
sλ′τ,s(I + Λ)− ρs+1λ′τ,s+1 + ρ2sβsΛ. (66)
Initialized at λN+1 = 0, (66) can be solved recursively backwards for a sequence {λτ,s} that
ensures orthogonality with respect to (ci,t−s, yi,t−s)s≥1. Finally, orthogonality with respect to
(ci,t, yi,t) is achieved by setting Ψ0 to satisfy (65), completing the proof.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3
The result follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 2. See the discussion in the main text for
details.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The result is a corollary to Proposition 4, which is derived under a less restricting lower
bound on information.
C.6 Proof of Lemma 5
Condition (47) is immediate from (30). Similarly, condition (48) is immediate after noticing
that ai,t is a linear combination of yi,t and ni,t and can, therefore, be omitted from (31). It
follows that in analog to Lemma 2, conditions (30) and (31) together with E[τt] = E[∆τi,t] = 0,
and τt and ∆τi,t being independent MA processes of at most order h¯ are jointly necessary
and sufficient to invoke the conditions of Theorem 1.
It remains to characterize the mappings (τ, ) 7→ (dy, dyˆ, dw) and (∆τ, f) 7→ (∆dc,∆dy,
∆dn,∆dw).
Characterization of aggregate variables The law of motions for dyt and dyˆt are imme-
diate from Lemma 1. The law of motion for dwt follows from (44),
dwt = t + pit + dτ
x,f
t , (67)
where pit is again characterized in Lemma 1.
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Characterization of Delta-variables The law of motions for ∆dyi,t and ∆dci,t are al-
ready characterized in (59) and (60). Subtracting dwt from (43) yields
∆dwi,t = ζ∆dni,t + ∆dci,t + ∆dτ
h
i,t. (68)
Finally, subtracting yt from (1), we get
∆dni,t = ∆dyi,t −∆dai,t. (69)
C.7 Proof of Proposition 3
The result is a corollary to Proposition 1, which is derived under a more restricting lower
bound on information.
C.8 Proof of Lemma 6
The result follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5. See the discussion in the main text for
details.
C.9 Proof of Proposition 4
From Lemma 6, we have that τx,fi,t = 0 implying τ
x
i,t = −τx,hi,t . Substituting in (47), combining
with (67)–(69), and evaluating at s = 0, yields
Cov

[
τ ct
−τxt
]
,
ξdτ
x
t + t
ξdτxt
pit + t

′ =
− Cov

[
∆τ ci,t
−∆τxi,t
]
,
 ∆dci,t∆dyi,t −∆dai,t
(ξ−1 − 1)(∆dyi,t −∆dai,t) + ∆dci,t −∆dτxi,t

′ .
Pre-multiplying both sides by [0, 1] and post-multiplying by [−1, 1− ξ−1, 1]′, we get
Cov[τxt , dτ
x
t − pit] = −Cov[∆τxi,t,∆dτxi,t].
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Observe that for any Corr[∆τxi,t,∆τ
x
i,t−1] ∈ [−1, 1] the right-hand side is weakly negative.
Hence it must hold that
Cov[τxt , dτ
x
t − pit] = Var[τxt ]− Cov[τxt , τxt−1]− Cov[τxt , pit] ≤ 0.
Multiplying by ξ2 and rearranging yields (29) in the main text. The proposition follows after
noting that for any Var[τxt ] > 0 the left-hand side of (29) is strictly positive, whereas the
right-hand side is non-positive when Corr[yˆt, pit] ≤ 0.
C.10 Proof of Lemma 4
The result follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 2. See the discussion in the main text for
details.
D Estimation of Unrestricted Wedge Process
Here we describe the methodology for estimating the unrestricted wedges τˆt used in Sec-
tion 5.3.
D.1 Description of Methodology
We model the unrestricted wedges as a MA(14) process, which loads on two intrinsic inno-
vations, represented by the 2× 1 vector ut, in addition to the productivity shock t,
τt = Φ(L)t + Φu(L)ut,
where Φ(L) and Φu(L) are square-summable lag polynomials in non-negative powers of L,
and t and ut are orthogonal white noise. W.l.o.g., we normalize Var[ut] = I2, leaving us to
estimate γma ≡ (Φ,Φu, σ). For this purpose, we use the generalized method of moments
(GMM) to minimize the distance between the model’s covariance structure and U.S. data on
real per-capita output, inflation, nominal interest rates, and per-capita hours.29 Let
Ω˜T = vech{Var[(q˜datat , . . . , q˜datat−k )]},
29Data range from 1960Q1 to 2012Q4. Real output is given by nominal output divided by the GDP
deflator. Inflation is defined as the log-difference in the GDP deflator. Interest rates are given by the Federal
Funds Effective rate. Hours are given by hours worked in the non-farm sector. Variables are put in per-capita
terms using the non-institutional population over age 16.
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denote the empirical auto-covariance matrix of frequency-filtered quarterly US data for q ≡
(yt, pit, it, nt). We target auto-covariances between zero and k = 8 quarters. For the filtering,
we use the Baxter and King (1999) approximate high-pass filter with a truncation horizon of
32 quarters, which we denote by q˜t ≡ BK 32(qt).30
To conserve on the 91 parameters that characterize γma, we make two observations, doc-
umented in Figure 4 below. First, Ω˜T is well-described by a VAR(1) process for τt. Second, a
MA(14) truncation of the VAR(1) process that best replicates Ω˜T is almost indistinguishable
(in terms of second moments) from the VAR(1) process itself. Accordingly, we construct γma
by first estimating τt as a VAR(1) that is driven by ut and t, and then constructing γˆma as
the MA(14) truncation of the estimated process.
Let γar denote the 10 parameters characterizing the VAR(1) and σ. Then the estimator
is given by
γˆar = argmin
γar
(Ω˜T − Ω˜(γar))′W−1(Ω˜T − Ω˜(γar)), (70)
where Ω˜(γar) is the model analogue to Ω˜T and W is a diagonal matrix with the bootstrapped
variances of Ω˜T along the main diagonal. To avoid the issues detailed in Gorodnichenko and
Ng (2009), our model analogue Ω˜(γar) is computed after applying the same filtering procedure
to the model that we have applied to the data.
A final challenge for estimating the model is that filtering the model can be computational
expensive. We address this issue by proving the following equivalence results.
Lemma 7. Estimator (70) is equivalent to
γˆar = argmin
γar
(ΩT − Ω(γar))′W˜−1(ΩT − Ω(γar)), (71)
where Ω ≡ vech{Var[(dst, . . . , dst−K)]} and W˜ ≡ (Ξ′W−1Ξ)−1 for K = k + 2τ¯ . The trans-
formation matrix Ξ is defined in (76).
The lemma establishes an exact equivalence (as opposed to an asymptotic equivalence)
between the original GMM estimator (70) and an alternative estimator where the unfiltered
model is estimated (in first differences) on unfiltered data and the filtering is achieved by
replacing W with W˜ . Using (71) in place of (70), estimation becomes straightforward as the
mapping from γar to Ω(γar) is available in closed form.
30The Baxter and King (1999) filter requires specification of a lag-length τ¯ for the approximation. We set
τ¯ to their recommended value of 12.
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Figure 4: Business cycle comovements in the data and predicted by the estimated model. Note.—All
covariances are multiplied by 100 to improve readability. Dashed black lines show the empirical covariance
structure Ω˜T together with 90 percent confidence intervals depicted by the shaded areas. Solid blue lines
show the corresponding model moments for the VAR(1) case, Ω˜(γˆar). Red dots show the model moments for
the truncated MA(14) case, Ω˜(γˆma). Each row i and column j in the table shows the covariances between q˜
i
t
and q˜jt−k with lags k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 8} depicted on the x-axis.
D.2 Fit
Figure 4 compares the predicted model moments with the targeted data moments. The
dashed black lines show the empirical covariance structure Ω˜T along with 90-percent con-
fidence intervals (depicted by the shaded areas). The solid blue and red lines show the
corresponding moments for the estimated model for the VAR(1) and MA(14) truncation of
the wedges, respectively. Each row i and column j in the table of plots shows the covariances
between q˜it and q˜
j
t−k with lags k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 8} depicted on the horizontal axis. Despite the
parametric restriction on τt and at and the fact that we have less shocks than data series, the
unrestricted-wedge model does a very good job at capturing the auto-covariance structure
of the four time series. In addition, there is no notable difference between the VAR(1) and
MA(14) truncation of τt.
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D.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Let
J =
(
Ω˜T − Ω˜(γ)
)′
W−1
(
Ω˜T − Ω˜(γ)
)
(72)
denote the penalty function in terms of BK-filtered moments, where the filter is applied
to both the data and the model. In this appendix, we demonstrate how the penalty
can be expressed in terms of the variance over unfiltered first-differenced moments, Ω ≡
vech
{
Var
(
dqtt−K
)}
, where d is the first-difference operator, and K ≡ k+2τ¯ with τ¯ denoting
the approximation horizon of the BK-filter.31 Specifically, for any positive-semidefinite W
we show that J in (72) is equivalent to
J = (ΩT − Ω(γ))′ W˜−1 (ΩT − Ω(γ)) , (73)
with W˜ ≡ (Ξ′W−1Ξ)−1 replacing W (a closed-form expression for Ξ is given below).
The Baxter and King (1999) filtered version of st takes the form
q˜t =
τ¯∑
j=−τ¯
ajqt−j
where q˜t is stationary by construction. For the high-pass filter used in this paper, the weights
{aj} are given by
aj = a˜j − 1
2τ¯ + 1
τ¯∑
j=−τ¯
a˜j
with
a˜0 = 1− ω¯/pi, α˜j 6=0 = − sin(jω¯)/(jpi), ω¯ = 2pi/32.
To construct the filter-matrix Ξ, rewrite q˜t in terms of growth rates to get
q˜t =
τ¯∑
j=−τ¯
∞∑
l=0
ajdqt−j−l.
Noting that
∑τ¯
j=−τ¯ aj = 0, we can simplify to get
q˜t = Bdq
t+τ¯
t−τ¯−j
31The first-difference filter is applied to the unfiltered variables to ensure stationarity for variables that
have a unit root. Our transformation includes an adjustment term that corrects for the fact that the filtered
moments in Ω˜ are about levels rather than first-differences.
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where
B = [b−τ¯ , . . . , bτ¯ ]⊗ In, (74)
n = 4 is the number of variables in q˜t, and bs =
∑s
j=−τ¯ αj.
Letting Lj define the backshift matrix
Lj =
[
0n(2τ¯+1),nj, In(2τ¯+1), 0n(2τ¯+1),n(k−j)
]
, (75)
we then have that
Σ˜j ≡ Cov(q˜, q˜t−j) = BL0ΣKL′jB′,
or, equivalently,
vec(Σ˜j) = (BLj ⊗BL0) vec(ΣK).
To complete the construction of Ξ, define selector-matrices P0 and P1 such that
vech(Σ˜k) = P0

vec(Σ˜0)
...
vec(Σ˜k)

and
vec(ΣK) = P1vech(Σ
K).
Stacking up vec(Σ˜j), we then get
Ω˜ = ΞΩ
where
Ξ = P0

BL0 ⊗BL0
...
BLk ⊗BL0
P1 (76)
with B and Lj as in (74) and (75). Substitution in (72) yields (73).
E Market Clearing in the Primal Economy
There are three sets of competitive markets operating at each date t in our model: a con-
tinuum of labor markets i ∈ [0, 1], an aggregate market for output, and the bond market.
Local labor market clearing is ensured by full information regarding Wi,t. As usual, market
clearing for bonds is implied by households’ budget constraints in conjunction with good
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market clearing. Imposing goods market clearing in the primal economy yields
Et[rt + dτ ct+1] = Et[dyˆt+1] = ξEt[dτxt+1]. (77)
For markets to clear, the real interest rate rt = φpit−Etpit+1 has to adjust so that consumers’
demand—taking into account households’ errors in their consumption decisions τ ct —matches
the output gap as determined by τxt . Clearly, for any stationary process for τ
c
t and τ
x
t , there
exists a process for rt so that (77) holds.
The key insight is that in the primal economy, any error made by households in their
consumption choice as reflected in Et[dτ ct+1] is endogenously offset by fluctuations in the
real interest rate. Intuitively, the degree of “awareness” regarding variations in the real
interest rate endogenously adjusts so that prices can perform their market clearing role.
This is fundamentally different from a parametric structure in which the expectation error
is determined endogenously and there may not be any solution to (77).
As an example, suppose consumers are perfectly informed about future consumption, so
we can interpret Et[rt+dτ ct+1] as the average expected interest rate, E¯t[rt]. With a parametric
information structure, we would need to ensure that E¯t[rt] is sufficiently responsive to the
output gap, ξτxt , which fails, e.g., if consumers have no information regarding rt. By contrast,
the primal approach endogenously pins down E¯t[rt] as the market-clearing object and fixing
τ ct merely determines how rt fluctuates with τ
x
t so that rt + Et[dτt+1] clears the market.
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